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I. INTRODUCTION 
The District abused its discretion when prevented Dr. Kemp from 
obtaining the name of, and conducting any discovery related to, the local physician 
assistant Plaintiffs'-Respondents Quigleys' ("Plaintiffs") out-of-state podiatry expert 
allegedly spoke to in an effort to meet the mandatory foundational requirements of 
Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, despite this Court's recent statement that a 
"defendant should be permitted to conduct discovery as to the identity of consulting 
physicians." 
Plaintiffs' response brief focuses heavily on two theories in an attempt to 
counter this basic discovery concept, neither of which justify affirming the decisions 
of the District Court or of depriving Dr. Kemp from discovering whether Plaintiffs' 
out-of-state podiatry expert has the required foundation to testify in this case. 
First, Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of the local physician assistant would 
'impermissibly heighten' the statutory requirements regarding familiarization with 
the local standard of care. In doing so, Plaintiffs confuse the statutory requirement 
of "be [ing] familiar with the local standard of care" with discovery in the case to 
verify the foundation of the expert's knowledge, i.e., if and how the out-of-state 
expert became familiar with the local standard of care. Here, discovery related to 
Plaintiffs' out-of-state podiatry expert, D.P.M. Nakra, is essential to determine 
whether she has the adequate foundation to testify in this case - a foundation she 
can only have if the anonymous physician assistant, whom D.P.M. Nakra claims to 
have consulted to gain familiarity with the applicable standard of care, in fact had 
knowledge of the local standard of care. Without that foundation, D.P.M. Nakra 
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would not be permitted to testify per Idaho Code Section 6-1013 and there is no way 
fol! Kemp, the District, and this Court to make that determination without 
discovery of that local physician assistant's identity and experience. Dr. Kemp is 
therefore entitled to that discovery. 
Second, much of Plaintiffs' attempt to shield discovery related to the local 
physician assistant to whom D.P.M. Nakra allegedly spoke to hinges on Plaintiffs' 
position that the local physician assistant is a retained, non-testifying consultant, 
per I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (now (b)(4)(D)). The record reflects no such retention. 
Moreover, even if the local physician assistant is considered a retained, non-
testifying consultant, his/her identity is not shielded by Rule 26(b)(4)(B), because 
D.P.M. Nakra is relying on that physician assistant's purported knowledge of the 
applicable local standard of care to establish she has met Idaho's foundational 
requirements imposed by Idaho law to obtain her "ticket to testify" in this case and 
testify as an expert in this case. As such, Dr. Kemp has shown "exceptional 
circumstances" that justify discovery related to the identify and knowledge of the 
local physician assistant with whom D.P.M. Nakra allegedly consulted to gain 
familiarity with the local standard of care. 
These arguments, as well as other minor points raised by Plaintiffs, fail to 
support Plaintiffs' position that local providers who provide the required 
foundational basis for a testifying expert's knowledge of the local standard of care 
can be kept secret. Instead, any such local provider is subject to discovery, and, as 
such, the District Court's October 5, 2015, Order Denying Motion to Compel and 
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Granting Motion for Protective Order Under I.R. C.P. 26(c) should be reversed and 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Permitting Discovery Regarding Whether D.P.M. Nakra Has Met the 
Statutory Requirements of Adequately Familiarizing Herself With 
the Local Standard of Care Does Not Impermissibly Heighten the 
Requirements of Required Testimony Under LC. §§6-1012 and -1013. 
Plaintiffs rely on Bybee v. Gorman to argue that requiring disclosure of a 
local provider with whom the expert conferred improperly elevates the testimonial 
requirements under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and -1013, basing this argument on 
remarks by both Chief Justice Jim Jones and Justice Horton in the Bybee decision. 
(Respondent's Brief at 6-7; Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 179, 335 P.3d 14, 24 
(2014).) This is an incorrect reading and application of Bybee. 
As noted previously, Bybee examined the viability of an affidavit in the 
summary judgment context-it was not ruling upon discovery related to local 
providers with whom a medical malpractice expert has conferred to familiarize 
themselves with the local standard of care: 
However, this Court has never held that failure to name the local 
expert with whom an out-of-area expert confers is fatal to the 
admissibility of that affidavit so long as the other foundation 
requirements are met. Indeed, a majority of this Court recently 
expressed "grave misgivings" about a plurality opinion's suggestion 
"that the identity of the local health care provider with whom a 
Plaintiff's expert consults must be disclosed as part of the foundation 
for that opinion," expressing our concern that such a rule "elevated 
the requirements for an expert's affidavit beyond the 
requirements of LC. § 6-1013." 
Bybee, 157 Idaho at 178, 335 P.3d at 23 (emphases added)(citation omitted). 
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Per Bybee, "[t]he trial court must look at the affidavit 'testimony and 
whether it alleges facts which, if taken as true, would render the 
testimony of that witness admissible."' Id. at 173, 335 P.3d at 18. Thus, in a 
summary judgment context, the identity of the local provider does not need to be 
disclosed in the opposition affidavit testimony. This is presumably because the 
court must assume the truth of the foundational facts offered in an expert's affidavit 
at the summary judgment stage. It is Dr. Kemp's position that the concerns about 
"heightening" expressed in Bybee relate only to challenges to affidavit testimony in 
a summary judgment setting where the facts must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and not in the discovery or trial setting. 
Therefore, this holding in Bybee has no application here because this appeal does 
not relate to a challenge to the sufficiency of D.P.M. Nakra's affidavit testimony on 
summary judgment, but instead relates to discovery regarding the foundational 
basis for D.P.M. Nakra's opinions. 
The Bybee court supports Dr. Kemp's position, stating that efforts to identify 
the local provider would be appropriate in non-summary judgment settings (to wit, 
discovery): 
The corollary of this holding is that defendant should be 
permitted to conduct discovery as to the identity of consulting 
physicians. As in Dunlap, an expert's claim to have consulted with a 
local practitioner in order to gain familiarity with the applicable 
standard of health care practice may present questions of 
credibility for consideration by the ultimate trier of fact. 
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, n.S)(emphases added). This is consistent with the core ideas that, in the 
medical malpractice context, (1) an out-of-area expert must sufficiently demonstrate 
an actual knowledge as to the local standard of care and (2) a practitioner in 
another specialty must demonstrate knowledge of the specialty at issue. See, e.g., 
)l_,1" tt T '/:, r, r, t r A T 1 ,-,-, T, h 468 4-~ 337 ...-,. r,, n~rr ""2 
.1.v1q, ox u. 1...t1,1e vare veners Of.f-lm., 1nc., 101 1aa o , 10, .t'.0a. b~I, 00· 
(2014)("As a result, '[a]n expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical 
malpractice actions must show that he or she is familiar with the standard of care 
for the particular health care professional for the relevant community and time" 
and "how he or she became familiar with that standard of care."'); Ballard v. Kerr, 
No. 42611, 2016 WL 4151043, at *5 (Idaho Aug. 4, 2016)("An expert of a different 
specialty may obtain actual knowledge of the standard of care through interacting 
and practicing with physicians of the applicable specialty.") 
As part of their argument, Plaintiffs also discuss the methodologies by which 
testifying experts may acquire knowledge of the local standard of care. 
(Respondent's Brief at 8-10.) Plaintiffs make some largely irrelevant discussion of 
how experts can familiarize themselves with deposition transcripts and texts 
(which, of course, should be specifically identified to allow for challenge, per Rule 
26(b)(4)(1)(i) & I.R.E. 705), but primarily argue that it is the local provider's 
"qualitative information" that should be scrutinized-implicitly arguing that the 
'quality' of information provided about D.P.M. Nakra's local provider was superior 
to that in, say, Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 291 P.3d 1000 (2012). 
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However, a simple comparison between the disclosure made in Arregui, 
versus the disclosure made in this matter, reveals that there 1s actually little 
difference. In Arregui, the disclosure stated: 
I have educated myself regarding the local standards of care prevailing 
in the Nampa-Caldwell area of Idaho, as they existed in June 2007. In 
addition to my education and experience, I have spoken with a local 
chiropractor, who maintained a chiropractic practice, in Caldwell, 
Idaho, in June 2007, the time period relevant to this litigation, as it 
was the time period, when Defendant chiropractically [sic] treated 
Plaintiff, Martha Arregui. It is my understanding that this 
chiropractor was appropriately licensed in Idaho as a chiropractor and 
maintained an active practice of chiropractic medicine during the 
relevant period. This chiropractor indicated to me that he was familiar 
with the local standards of care for performing chiropractic procedures 
in the Nampa and Caldwell communities by licensed chiropractors at 
the time that the chiropractic care at issue in this case was rendered to 
the patient. This physician further confirmed to me that the local 
standards of care at that time were, in all respects, consistent with 
and, in fact, identical to the standards of care upon which my opinions 
in this case have been based, namely, the standards of care in 
Oceanside, California in June 2007. 
Arregui, 153 Idaho at 809, 291 P.3d at 1008. In the instant case, D.P.M. Nakra's 
disclosure stated substantially the same. (R. at 73-7 4.) It was precisely this kind of 
"meager" information that the Court rejected in Arregui: 
Rather, in a medical malpractice case, it must be shown that the 
expert possesses sufficient knowledge of the specific procedures used 
by the defendant physician as the alleged malpractice. Here, the 
Patient merely asked the district court to believe Dr. Tamai's 
conclusory statements that the local unidentified chiropractor 
was familiar with the standard of care and because Dr. Tamai 
spoke with him, she was also now familiar with the local 
standard of care. Such meager information is insufficient. 
Arregui, 153 Idaho at 809, 291 P.3d at 1008 (citations omitted)(emphases added). 
Without discovery of the local physician assistant's identity and credentials, Dr. 
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Kemp, the District Court, and this Court cannot evaluate D.P.M. Nakra's 
statements" that the local physician assistant was, fact, actually 
familiar with the applicable standard of care. As such, Dr. Kemp, the District 
Court, and this Court cannot evaluate whether D.P.M. Nakra has adequately 
familiarized herself with the applicable local standard of care and, thus, met the 
foundational requirements of I. C. §6-1013. 
In an apparent attempt to minimize the importance of the foundation upon 
which D .P .M. N akra bases her alleged know ledge of the applicable standard of care, 
Plaintiffs claim that "Dr. Kemp did not challenge the sufficiency of the foundation 
for D.P.M. Nakra's opinions." (Respondent's Brief at 10.) Plaintiffs are simply 
wrong in that assertion, because that is precisely why Dr. Kemp sought the 
discovery, and why Dr. Kemp now pursues the issue on appeal. Dr. Kemp is trying 
to discover, and based on what is learned in discovery, potentially challenge the 
foundational basis of D.P.M. Nakra's knowledge of the applicable local standard of 
care. 
D.P.M. Nakra does not practice in Idaho, does not practice orthopedic 
surgery, and is not board-certified in orthopedic surgery. Thus, D.P.M. Nakra's only 
foundational basis for the local standard of care comes from a local physician 
assistant. Plaintiffs claim that the anonymous local physician assistant has the 
reguisite personal foundational knowledge regarding the local standard of care; yet, 
they admit the unidentified physician assistant is not an orthopedic surgeon and is 
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not board-certified, and they provide only "meager" allusions to his/her work 
Because Plaintiffs have provided such meager information regarding the local 
physician assistant's qualifications and knowledge of the applicable standard of 
care, Dr. Kemp may only acquire such information through compelled discovery. 
Dr .. Kemp is entitled to learn whether the unidentified physician assistant is 
actually licensed in Idaho and whether the unidentified physician assistant actually 
had work experience as represented at the time of Dr. Kemp's care. Discovery will 
also illuminate the details of the actual conversation between D.P.M. Nakra and the 
physician assistant and in particular, whether any such conversation actually even 
occurred. 
These are all relevant questions, given they may go to credibility and/or the 
sufficiency of foundational knowledge of D.P.M. Nakra herself. See, e.g., Navo v. 
Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 160 Idaho 363, 368 n.4, 373 P.3d 681, 686 n.4 (2016) reh'g 
denied June 9, 2016. (quoting local provider's disavowal of alleged conversation with 
plaintiffs expert); Bybee, 157 Idaho at 179, n.8, 335 P.3d at 24 n.8 ("As in Dunlap, 
an expert's claim to have consulted with a local practitioner in order to gain 
familiarity with the applicable standard of health care practice may present 
questions of credibility for consideration by the ultimate trier of fact.") 
Nothing about allowing discovery into D.P.M. Nakra's relied-upon local 
physician assistant creates any kind of heightened requirement as to testimony 
under LC. §§6-1012 or -1013. Accordingly, the District Court should have allowed 
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discovery regarding the anonymous local provider that D.P.M. Nakra relied upon 
the District Court's decisions on discovery should be reversed. 
B. I.R.C.P. 26 (h)(4)(B) Does Not Preclude Disclosure of the Identity of 
the Consulting Local Specialist Relied Upon by D.P.M. Nakra. 
Plaintiffs' response to Dr. Kemp's arguments as to the District Court's error 
in using I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (now I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(D)) to shield discovery of the local 
provider are notable for what they do not respond to. First, Plaintiffs' argument 
that I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) allows them to keep secret the identity of the local provider 
upon whom D.P.M. Nakra relied is largely premised on an unsupported argument 
that they "retained non-testifying experts to consult with and educate D.P.M. 
Nakra." (Respondent's Brief at 11.) In response briefing, Plaintiffs cite nothing in 
the record that establishes that the local specialist(s) were actually "retained" or 
"specially employed," beyond the bare allegations of the Plaintiffs' counsel, thus 
rendering I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) inapplicable. (Tr. 16:16-17:10.) Plaintiffs' attempt to 
av?id this fact by asserting that "Dr. Kemp did not raise this issue in his moving 
papers to the district court below[.]" (Respondents' Brief at 11, n.4.) Dr. Kemp did 
raise this argument at the hearing on the at-issue motions: 
[MS. DUKE:] And so one other point I will note with 
subpart (B) is that there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that this local person, this local 
physician assistant who is not an orthopedic 
surgeon was retained. It's just a bare allegation. 
We don't have any testimony in the record that she 
was paid any money, retained. You're not retained 
by just calling somebody and saying, "Hey, can I ask 
you a couple questions to see if the local standard 
for an orthopedic surgeon in Boise at this time is 
the same as the national standard," or whatever that 
conversation was. There is nothing in the record other 
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than forcing her under this subpart (B). 
at 16:16-20 & 1-10.)1 Plaintiffs also fail to cite any authority wherein 
local providers have previously been shielded from discovery under the auspices of 
LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B)-again, making LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) inapplicable. 
Further, Plaintiffs do not-and cannot-dispute that the non-discovery 
provisions of LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) allow discovery of the identity of consulting 
experts. Instead, they only contend that such argument is "form over substance." 
(Respondent's Brief at 18, n.8.) This is incorrect. Even if the local provider were 
actually retained and even if I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) were to apply, Dr. Kemp would 
still be entitled to the identity of the local provider, at a minimum. Manzo v. 
Stanley Black & Decker Inc., 2015 WL 136011, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 
2015)("Although the case law is not entirely uniform, the majority of courts hold 
that the identities of non-testifying experts, as opposed the 'facts known or opinions 
held' by such experts, is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(l), providing for discovery 
of the 'identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter,' as 
opposed to (b)(4)(B), now (b)(4)(D). As a result, identity information is discoverable 
without a showing of 'exceptional circumstances."');2 accord Idaho R. Evid. 705. 
1 It is accurate that the District Court failed to address this issue/argument before 
ruling that the secret local provider was protected as a non-testifying consultant 
under Rule 26(b)(4)(B). 
2 Where there is no Idaho interpretation of a procedural rule, interpretations of 
similar provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are considered persuasive 
authority. See David Steed & Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247, 249, 766 P.2d 
717, 719 (1988) ("Although we are not bound by the federal rule, inasmuch as the 
Idaho rule is based upon a federal rule of the same nature, the federal court's 
interpretation of the rule is persuasive."); Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber 
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In failing to rebut these arguments, Plaintiffs instead argue, in essence, that 
Dr. Kemp can simply just "obtain information regarding the local standard of care 
from another source (including himself)." (Respondent's Brief at 12-13.) This 
argument misses the point. While Dr. Kemp of course knows the standard of care 
that applied to him when he treated Ivfrs. Quigley, what is relevant to this appeal is 
how D .P .M. N akra has know ledge of the standard of care she wishes to testify to in 
this case, and whether that knowledge provides her with the necessary foundation 
to testify. 
D.P.M. Nakra has advanced an opinion that the standard of care is different 
than that to which Dr. Kemp has testified to, despite her lack of practice as a board-
certified orthopedic surgeon and her lack of practice in Idaho. To do so, she has 
relied on an unidentified physician assistant she wishes to keep secret; that is, a 
non-medical doctor who is not board-certified in orthopedic surgery. It is the facts 
and opinions upon which D.P.M. Nakra has based her opinions that Dr. Kemp seeks 
to discover so that he can evaluate whether the physician assistant D.P.M. Nakra 
has had to rely on to testify in this case in fact has knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care. That only source is the local physician assistant. This is further 
consistent with Idaho Rule of Evidence 705, which provides that the underlying 
facts and data of an expert's opinion must be disclosed if requested in discovery and 
that the expert may be cross examined regarding the underlying facts or data. 
Plaintiffs also miss the point by arguing that the Court could correctly hold 
Co., 89 Idaho 389, 396, 405 P.2d 634 (1965) ("[T]he federal construction will be 
regarded as most persuasive."). 
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that D.P.M. Nakra met the foundational requirements of §6-1013. (Respondent's 
at 13.) District Court could not make such a decision that could be 
affirmed by this Court because the District Court was addressing cross-motions on 
thE? discovery issue of the local provider, not ultimately vetting D.P.M. Nakra as an 
expert. Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion that "I don't think that I have any 
intimation that D.P.M. Nakra is telling a falsehood under oath when she said she 
had the conversation with the people she said she had" (Tr. at 11. 27:4-8) cannot be 
substantiated until discovery of the local physician assistant is permitted to 
determine whether he/she in fact has the required knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care that D.P.M. Nakra can rely on as an out-of-state expert who wishes 
to testify in this case. It is legally irrelevant that the District Court may "think" 
that there would not be any reason for an expert witness to mischaracterize such an 
interaction (without any information other than D.P.M. Nakra's own unexamined 
statement). 
The Navo decision aptly demonstrates why the District Court's conclusion on 
this point is incorrect. 160 Idaho at 375, 373 P.3d at 683. In Navo, the Court agreed 
with the District Court determination that the plaintiffs had "failed to provide 
evidence that he [their expert] was familiar with the relevant local standard of 
care[.]" Id. That determination was squarely predicated on the shortcomings of the 
local provider: 
[W]e hold that the district court was correct in finding that in and of 
itself, Dr. Steinberg's conversation with Judith Nagel was not 
sufficient to give him actual knowledge of the local standard of care in 
Blackfoot in December of 2008. In order for Judith Nagel to have 
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familiarized Dr. Steinberg with the standard of care, she would have 
had to herself been familiar with that standard of care. Appellants fail 
to produce any evidence that Judith Nagel was familiar with the local 
standard of care in Blackfoot in December of 2008. 
Id., at 380-81, 373 P.3d at 690-91. This determination was buttressed by the local 
provider's own disavowal of the expert's characterization of their interaction and 
her clarification as to her actual lack of knowledge of the local standard of care, as 
discussed by the Court: 
In conjunction with its motion to strike, BMH submitted the affidavit 
of Judith Nagel, stating that: 
I do not recall making any statements to Dr. Steinberg about 
community standards for nurse anesthetists or for hospitals 
either in Idaho or other states. Furthermore, I do not have 
actual knowledge of the local community standard of health 
care practice that applied to BMH or nurse anesthetists in 
Blackfoot, Idaho, in December 2008. 
Id.at 368 n.4, 373 P.3d at 686 n.4. Thus, Navo demonstrates that, contrary to the 
District Court's conclusion, the possibility a testifying expert may incorrectly 
characterize a communication with a local provider is a very real one, and this 
mischaracterization can significantly impact the outcome of a case. 
Precluding Dr. Kemp from discovering whether the physician assistant has 
actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care leaves D.P.M. Nakra's opinions. 
unverified and does not permit Dr. Kemp, the District Court, or this Court to 
determine whether D.P.M. Nakra has in fact met the foundational requirements of 
Idaho Section 6-1012 and Idaho Code Section 6-1013. Even if the anonymous 
physician assistant is deemed a non-testifying consultant under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B), 
the fact that D.P.M. Nakra-a retained, testifying expert-utilized that individual's 
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knowledge as a basis to form her own opinions, mandates that such individual loses 
ability avoid discovery. I.R.E. 705 ("The expert may testify in terms of 
opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the 
underlying facts or data, provided that the court may require otherwise, and 
provided further that, if requested pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying 
facts or data were disclosed. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the 
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."); see also Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 
F.R.D. 638, 647 (D. Kan. 2000)("In sum, the policy reasons, the plain language of 
amended Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the Advisory Committee Note, and the weight of 
authority supports this Court's conclusion that any type of privileged material, 
including materials or documents prepared by a non-testifying expert, lose their 
privileged status when disclosed to, and considered by, a testifying expert."). Where 
an expert relies upon a "non-testifying expert" to formulate their opinions, that non-
te~tifying expert can be deposed. See, e.g., Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
1999 WL 1456538, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 1999), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000)("The court need not waste its time 
analyzing the work of Dr. Medoffs assistant as the work of a so-called "non-
testifying" expert. Dr. Medoff and his assistant worked hand-in-glove, and the fruits 
of their labor are indivisible. Defendant cannot properly cross-examine Dr. Medoff 
without first understanding how his assistant manipulated the data."). 
The rationale, as explained by the Derrickson court, is simple: Rule 
26{b)(4)(B) is designed to keep opposing parties from "free riding" off of the work by 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 16 
the other side, but it is not to be used as a mechanism to hide key foundational 
evidence from those opposing parties: 
Even if the court considered Dr. Medoff's assistant to be a non-
testifying expert, the result would be the same. Defendant is not 
engaging in the sort of free riding that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was meant to 
prevent. The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to prevent a party from 
building its own case through its opponent's diligence. In this instance, 
Defendant does not seek to build its own case with Dr. Medoff's work 
but rather seeks to tear down Plaintiffs' case. That is entirely proper. 
Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 1999 WL 1456538, at *8 (citations omitted). 
Further, the Derrickson court explained that it was precisely because the non-
testifying expert had the core information the testifying expert relied on, that the 
non-testifying expert and information he had was discoverable: 
Id: 
Moreover, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides that the "facts known and the 
opinions held by an expert ... who is not expected to be called at trial" 
are discoverable "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under 
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts 
or opinions on the same subject by other means." Only Dr. Medoff's 
assistant knows what he did to the data, and because that information 
is exclusively within the assistant's cognizance, Defendant is entitled 
to it under Rule 26(b)(4)(B). 
To testify in this case, D.P.M. Nakra must meet the requirements of Idaho 
law that mandate she must be adequately familiar with the applicable standard of 
care for orthopedic surgeons practicing in Boise, Idaho at the time Dr. Kemp cared 
for Mrs. Quigley. As an out-of-state expert, D.P.M. Nakra could not do so because 
she has never practiced orthopedic surgery or podiatry in Idaho. As such, she relies 
on a conversation with a local physician assistant, who also does not practice 
orthopedic surgery in Idaho, to advise her on the applicable standard of care for an 
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orthopedic surgeon in Idaho. The only way that anyone other D.P.M. Nakra and 
Plaintiffs can determine whether this conversation provided D.P.M. Nakra with the 
necessary foundation to testify in this case is to conduct discovery of that physician 
assistant and his/her practice and to question him/her about the alleged 
conversation with D.PJv'.L Nakra. This situation certainly presents the "exceptional 
circumstances" allowed by LR.CP. 26(b)(4)(D) if the Court determines that Rule 
applies to this case. 
For these reasons, even if LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (now 26(b)(4)(D)) applies, it 
does not preclude discovery of the anonymous physician assistant and the District 
Court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion for protective order and denying Dr. 
Kemp's motion to compel. 
C. Plaintiffs' proposal of utilizing discovery motions in every medical 
malpractice case disregards Bybee, the discovery rules, and 
unnecessarily burdens the courts and parties. 
Recognizing that Bybee acknowledges the need for discovery of local 
providers,3 Plaintiffs suggest that a process wherein the district court makes a 
preliminary determination regarding whether a testifying expert has met the 
foundational requirements of 6-1013, then determining whether a local provider 
needs to be disclosed, would create a predictable and workable solution. 
(Respondent's Brief at 14). The crux of Plaintiffs' argument essentially eviscerates 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(4)(a)(i), and the 
importance of establishing the proffered expert's foundation, including the 
3 "The corollary of this holding is that defendant should be permitted to conduct 
discovery as to the identity of consulting physicians." Bybee, 157 Idaho at 179, n.8. 
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underlying facts and data an expert relies upon to testify and render opinions in a 
case. Adopting Plaintiffs' unrealistic position in essence permits testifying experts 
to represent whatever they want about conversations with local providers and forces 
the opposing party to go to the cost and effort to determine whether additional 
discovery can be had related to the expert's foundation and opinions. 
Plaintiffs' proposal is premised on the assumption that such local providers 
are non-testifying consultants, retained or not, under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). However, 
reliance by the testifying expert on the information provided by a local provider 
waives any protections under LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). Further, the "data or other 
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions" is already required 
to be produced, per LR.C.P. 26(4)(a)(i), as well as I.RE. 705. 
In addition, discovery motions are to be made in good faith, and discovery 
disputes are to be attempted to be resolved without court action. See generally, 
I.R.C.P. 26(c) & 37(a). Judicial economy would be thwarted if a party could refuse 
to produce information required by the Rules by triggering motion practice on 
discovery in every single medical malpractice case involving an out-of-area expert, 
imposing unnecessary costs and time burdens on the courts. Nothing in the Rules 
or the medical malpractice statutes contemplates the overly burdensome and 
expensive additional motion practice proposed by Plaintiffs. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' position undercuts the purpose of the rule in vetting the 
out-of-state expert. Here, the District Court merely read a brief summary prepared 
by Plaintiffs' counsel of D.P.M. Nakra's purported conversation with the 
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unidentified individual. As such, the District Court's hearing only weighed phantom 
evidence (the credibility D.P.M. Nakra), while simultaneously depriving Dr. 
Kemp of verifying that evidence or securing any contradictory evidence. 
By shielding the physician assistant from discovery, neither the District 
Court, this Court, nor Dr. Kemp have the ability to interrogate the veracity and 
substance of the foundation for D.P.M. Nakra's opinions. Under Plaintiffs' rule, the 
parties (whether plaintiffs or defendants), as well as the court are prevented from 
securing evidence like that secured from the local provider in Navo without 
burdening the Court with discovery motions in every case. Under Plaintiffs' rule, 
assurances that the proffering party's procedure "enables a district court to consider 
the relative weight of competing evidence" are empty, as the opposition would be 
affirmatively prevented from compiling "competing evidence." (Respondent's Brief 
at-17.) 
Finally, Plaintiffs' assurances that "in a case where plaintiffs' expert does not 
provide specific, detailed explanation of their actual knowledge of the standard of 
care, it would be appropriate to allow inquiry into the basis for why said expert 
claims to have knowledge of said undisclosed fact" appears to be little more than a 
contention that if a testifying expert botches their disclosure as to foundation for 
local standard of care, they can still supplement that at some unspecified later 
date-but still not disclose their sources. Any such subjective evaluation is 
unworkable; the only appropriate workable solution is disclosure of the local 
provider. Just as the testifying expert would have to specifically identify any 
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deposition or medical text they relied on for purposes of the local standard of care, 
any local providers the testifying expert utilizes should be identified and subject to 
the same kind of scrutiny to evaluate bases for the testifying expert's opinions. 
As such, the remedy offered by Plaintiffs cures nothing, and instead offers 
only an unnecessary, expensive discovery process to validate the refusal to produce 
information that is required to be produced under the Rules. Under such a 
proposal, the District Court judges in medical malpractice cases would essentially 
be considering whether additional discovery related to an expert's foundation was or 
was not warranted. Not only would this yield non-predictable results, it would 
unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation for all parties, would burden the already 
busy District Court judges with unnecessary discovery disputes, and would create 
appealable issues-and, therefore, significantly more appeals-as to whether the 
District Court abused its discretion with respect to its ruling on each and every 
case. Accordingly, the District Court's decisions should be reversed. 
D. The District Court Erred in Making Extra-Statutory Considerations 
Favoring Non-Disclosure of Local Specialists. 
Plaintiffs argue that "the district court made it abundantly clear that such 
'extra-statutory' considerations did not factor into its decisions," quoting a portion of 
the District Court's commentary (on an argument raised by Plaintiffs via affidavit 
from a medical malpractice plaintiffs' attorney) about a "conspiracy" against local 
providers who provide local standard of care information. (Tr. 25:18-26:15.) 
Ph:1intiffs quote the portion of the transcript where the District Court comments 
that "[t]here is certainly no record that that's what's going on here," but neglect to 
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quote the preceding commentary from the District Court, which makes clear that 
District Court resolving the interpretation in light of this "conspiracy": 
And it is an ongoing issue. And I 
think I have to resolve it the only way I can by 
construing the rules because -- I appreciate 
Mr. Mahoney's sentiments that there is a 
conspiracy, and I think, frankly, that the whole 
legal community knows that it's extremely 
difficult to find a local expert. I even had an 
occasion where, when I was in private practice, I 
had a local expert willing to testify until his 
malpractice carrier called and said, "If you 
testify in this case, we are going to cancel your 
insurance." And if you get your insurance 
canceled as a professional, you don't get it 
anywhere else. That's a kiss of death. 
So that stuff goes on. 
(Tr. at 11. 25:18-26:7)(emphasis added). Thus, more correctly, the District Court 
appeared to be framing its construction of the rules through the lens of a 
"conspiracy" that makes it "difficult to find a local expert." Such consideration is in 
error, and the District Court's decisions should be reversed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Out-of-area medical malpractice experts lacking knowledge of the local 
standard of care do not get a "ticket-to-testify" unless they become familiar with 
that local standard of care. Absent this familiarization, an out-of-area expert 
cannot claim to be on equal footing with the physician they have been hired to 
criticize. To assess that familiarization, a defending physician must have the 
ability to assess the most basic of issues with how that retained out-of-area expert 
became familiar with the local standard of care. 
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Here, the District Court's refusal to permit discovery as to the local physician 
assistant has crippled Dr. Kemp's ability to make those assessments. That, in turn, 
impairs Dr. Kemp's ability to seek dismissal, if appropriate, if the local physician 
assistant lacked the ability, or otherwise failed, to convey the local standard of care 
correctly to D.P.fv:L Nakra. The discovery sought is not complex. Either the local 
provider is a licensed practitioner qualified to provide such information to D.P.M. 
Nakra, or she is not. Either the local provider has the represented work history and 
experience that reflects actual knowledge of the local standard or care, or she does 
not. Either she had the represented standard of care conversation(s) with D.P.M. 
Nakra, or she did not. Any of these issues may give rise to a dispositive motion by 
Dr. Kemp. The District Court's refusal, however, to allow discovery of the local 
physician assistant slams the door shut on discovery of issues that go to the validity 
of whether D.P.M. Nakra has the necessary foundation to testify in this case. 
For these reasons, the District Court abused its discretion when it prevented 
Dr. Kemp from obtaining the name of, and conducting discovery related to, the local 
physician assistant that Plaintiffs' out-of-state podiatry expert allegedly spoke to in 
an effort to meet the statutory foundational requirements of Idaho Code Sections 6-
1012 and 6-1013 and whether, in fact, he/she was adequately familiar with the 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Kemp. 
Based on the above, Dr. Kemp respectfully requests that the October 5, 2015 
Order Denying Motion to Compel and Granting Motion for Protective Order Under 
I.R.C.P. 26(c) be reversed and remanded to the District Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
~ tluqUPf-q.:-- day of :May, 2016. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 'I J;ay of August, 2016, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Vaughn Fisher 
~ebecca Rainey 
Allison M. Blackman 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 345-7000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Raymond D. Powers 
POWERS TOLMAN FARLEY, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 577-5100 
Attorneys for Defendant Christopher Tobe, M.D. 
Andrew C. Brassey 
BRASSEY CRAWFORD, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 215 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone (208) 344-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 25 
ill U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 297-2689 
lyJ Email 
vaughn@frhtriallawyers.com 
rar@frhtriallawyers.com 
allison@frhtriallawyers.com 
'i9, U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5101 
~ Email 
rdp@powerstolman.com 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 344-7077 
~ Email 
acb@brassey.net 
